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BETWEEN THE GLASS AND
THE HAND
The Eye in Margaret Cavendish's
Blaiing World
Anna Battigelli

\n Micrographia (1665), Robert Hooke suggested that the
•eyepieces of telescopes and microscopes functioned as
.correctives to the infirm and corrupt senses through
which we know the world.* Visible, through the eyepieces of
optical instruments, he claimed
there is a new visible World discovered to the understand
ing. By this means the Heavens are open'd and a vast
number of new Stars, and new Motions, and new
Productions appear in them, to which all the antient
Astronomers were utterly Strangers. By this the Earth it
self, which lyes so neer us, under our feet, shews quite a
' This article began in a 1992 NEH Summer Seminar in London directed by
Professor Paula Backscheider, for whose assistance and support I am profoimdly
grateful.
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new thing to us, and in every little particle of its matter,
we now behold almost as great a variety of Creatures, as
we were able before to reckon up in the whole Universe
it self (sig. AzI')}

For Hooke and for his fellow empiricists, "the Science of
Nature" had for too long been an exclusive product of "the
Brain and Fancy" (Hooke, sig. AbF). The innate and inborn
corruption of man that weakened the operations of the mind
could be corrected, in part, by "the adding of artificial Organs
[such as optical glasses] to the natural" (sig. Aa2'). In this
manner, the secret workings of nature could be accurately
examined and the "light, by which our actions are to be
guided...be renewed, and all our command over things...be
establisht" (sig. AaF).
Accordingly, the Baconian reformation in natural philosophy
that Hooke proposes in the preface to Micrographia insistently
subordinates the operations of the mind to the exact observa
tions of the eye aided by an optical glass; it requires neither
"strength of imagination, [n]or exactness of Method, [n]or depth
of contemplation...[so much as it requires] a sincere Hand, and
a faithful Eye to examine, and to record the things themselves
as they appear" (sig.
Correspondingly, Micrographia is
a compendium of pieces of the new world that Hooke found as
he gazed through the eyepieces of microscopes and telescopes.
His precise drawings of fleas, ants, needles, bookworms, the face
of the moon, and other items from the natural world are the
^ Robert Hooke, Micrographia; or, Some Physiological Descriptions of Minute Bodies
Made by Magnifying Glasses with Observations and Inquiries Thereupon (1665;
facsimile rpt., New York: Dover, 1961); all subsequent quotations from
Micrographia are cited in the text.
' Hooke's reformation wiU be recognized as echoing Francis Bacon, who argued
for a new science in which anyone might participate: "My way of discovering
sciences goes far to level men's wits; and leaves but httle to individual excellence,
because it performs everything by the surest rules and demonstrations." See
Christopher Hill, Intellectual Origins of the English Revolution (Oxford: Clarendon
Press, 1991), 88.
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empiricist product of a cycle of inquiry that leaves little room
for what Hooke understood to be the faulty operations of
sense, memory, or reason. In fact, for Hooke, the cycle of
observation to be used by the new experimental philosophers
is mechanistic, an idea he conveys by comparing the cycle
through which an object is perceived and then inscribed onto
paper to the circulation of the blood:
So many are the links, upon which the true Philosophy
depends, of which, if any one be loose, or weak, the
whole chain is in danger of being dissolv'd; it is to begin
with the Hands and Eyes, and to proceed on through the
Memory, to be continued by the Reason; nor is it to stop
there, but to come about to the Hands and Eyes again,
and so, by a continual passage round from one Faculty to
another, it is to be maintained in life and strength, as
much as the body of man is by the circulation of the
blood through the several parts of the body, the Arms,
the Fat, the Lungs, the Heart, and the Head. (sig. hhT)
Like many others, Hooke seems to have been struck by the
sudden possibility presented by William Harvey's study of the
circulation of the blood: that man was a machine or an
automaton.
Accordingly, he portrays his new natural
philosopher as an automaton-scribe whose single function is to
record accurately with his "sincere Hand" what is seen through
the glass with the "faithful eye."
It was in response to Robert Hooke's promise to reveal a
new visible world through the "sincere hand" and "faithful eye"
of the empiricist that Mai^aret Cavendish published Observa
tions Upon Experimental Philosophy in 1666, the year after the
publication of Micrographia. To Observations, she appended a
fictional illustration of its precepts. The Description of a New
Blazing World, hereafter referred to as Blazing World. Readers
tend to read Observations and Blazing World separately, but the
two are in fact companion pieces; although the former takes the
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form of scientific discourse and the latter of romantic fantasy,
both are philosophical texts that reject Hooke's empiricism and
his celebration of microscopes and telescopes by presenting
models of human perception radically different from Hooke's.
To Hooke's empiricism, both works propose "an Arguing of
the mind," or rationalism, as an alternative mode of inquiry for
understanding the world. In the preface to Observations,
Cavendish compares rationalism directly with empiricism and
its reliance on the eye and on optical glasses:
Discourse shall sooner find out Nature's Corporeal
figurative Motions, than Art [the deluding art of optical
glasses] shall inform the Senses; By Discourse, I do not
mean Speech, but an Ai^uing of the mind, or a Rational
Inquiry into the Causes of Natural effects; for Discourse
is as much as Reasoning with our selves.'*
This definition of rationalism as "an Arguing of the mind"
echoes Thomas Hobbes's discussion of "Mentall Discourse" in
Leviathan, with which Cavendish was surely familiar.® In fact,
Hobbes may well have helped shape Cavendish's interest in
optics and in the problem of subjectivity, since both were topics
he shared with William Cavendish during their lifelong
friendship.® Yet her literal application of rationalism poses a
* Margaret Cavendish, Observations Upon Experimental Philosophy: To which is
added, the Description of a New Blazing World, 2nd ed. (London, 1668), c2V-c3R.
All subsequent quotations from Observations and Blazing World are cited in the
text.
' Thomas Hobbes's recent biographer, Arnold Rogow, writes that "Hobbes's
influence on the duchess and her works is unknown, but there can be no doubt of
his influence on [William] Newcastle" (118). Margaret Cavendish's familiarity with
Hobbes's work emei^es in her frequent attempts at correcting him. Even Blazing
World can be read as an attack on Hobbes's materialism, and Hobbes's influence
is evident elsewhere throughout her work. See Arnold Rogow, Thomas Hobbes:
Radical in the Service of Reaction (New York: W. W. Norton, 1986).
' Hobbes dedicated A Minute or first Draught of the Optiques (1646) to William
Cavendish, then Marquis of Newcastle, claiming in his dedicatory preface that
"that which I have writt of it, is grounded especially upon that which about 16

Between the Glass and the Hand

29

difficulty for her readers, leading as it does to the frequently
bewildering dialogic mode that characterizes her work. She
took her interest in pursuing the random arguing of her mind
to extremes, claiming, for instance to dismiss revision in order
to pursue her thoughts: "I did many times not peruse the
copies that were transcribed, lest they should disturb my
following conceptions."^ And her work often appears to be a
compulsive record of the discourse in her mind with little or no
attempt at shaping the rambling discursive stream into a focused
argument. Yet read within the context of and as a response to
the rising confidence with which empiricism was being
embraced, the willfully eccentric dialogic mode of both
Observations and Blazing World serves to highlight the
unpredictable and often willful nature of the self.
By
highlighting the problem of subjectivity, the briefer Blazing
World serves as a useful introduction to her fuller, though no
more systematic, critique of empiricism. Observations.
In Blazing World, Cavendish defines her role as author in
opposition to the image of the empiricist gazing into his
microscope: instead of peering through a glass in order to serve
as a scribe through which an observed fraction of the external
world appears reproduced and magnified on paper. Cavendish
looks inward, freely exercising her subjective use of perspective
over the worlds, actual and imaginary, within her head. The
inventive, wildly improbable, and self-referential narrative that
results calls into question Hooke's objective certainty by
displaying the unpredictability of the self and its inevitable
interposition in the process of perception.^
Like Rene
yeares since I affirmed to your Lordship at Welbeck, that light is a fancy in the
minde, caused by motion in the brain" (British Library, Harleian MSS. 3,360: 3).
Elsewhere I discuss Cavendish's debt to Hobbes more fully.
' Margaret Cavendish, The Life of William Cavendish, Duke of Newcastle to which
is added the True Relation of my Birth, Breeding and Life, ed. C. H. Firth (London:
Routledge, 1906), xxxvii.
' Cavendish's obsessive interest in the "selP has been explained variously.
Catherine Gallagher uses Cavendish's insistence on her singularity and her
comparisons of herself to an absolute monarch to make the larger and convincing
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Descartes, who more methodically but no less certainly trusted
the workings of the mind to arrive at the truth, Cavendish
looks inward to find what truth can be found. Unlike
Descartes, however. Cavendish finds no need for convincing
proof; the frequently eccentric dialogic mode that characterizes
both Observations and Blazing World aims at delight and
surprise rather than proof. By inscribing her own subjective
eccentricity onto her narrative, she highlights the problem she
sees as inherent in Hooke's plan: if. Cavendish seems to point
out, an observer can be as eccentric as she reveals herself to be,
how are we to rely on such an observer's "eye" for empirical
objectivity.' In Blazing World and Observations, Cavendish
focuses on the subjectivity in which our inquiry into the world
is inevitably trapped.
Cavendish first defines herself in opposition to Hooke's
empiricist in the narrative frame constructed in the preface to
Blazing World. There she claims that her frustrated ambition
in the material world has caused her to turn to the immaterial
worlds of her imagination:
I am...as Ambitious as ever any of my Sex was, is, or can
be; which makes, that though I cannot be Henry the
Fifth, or Charles the Second, yet I endeavour to be
Mai^aret the First. And although I have neither power,
time nor occasion to Conquer the "World as Alexander
and Caesar did; yet rather then [sic] not to be Mistress of
one, since Fortune and the Fates would give me none, I
claim that, at least during the seventeenth century, "Toryism and feminism
converge because the ideology of absolute monarchy provides, in particular
historical situations, a transition to an ideology of the absolute self." Dolores
Paloma explains Cavendish's interest in the "self" and in portraits of the female
hero more personally, claiming that the figure of the female hero "allows her to
express a strong sense of self as a unique being." See Catherine Gallagher,
"Embracing the Absolute: The Politics of the Female Subject in SeventeenthCentury England," Genders 1 (1988): 24-89; Dolores Paloma, "Margaret
Cavendish: Defining the Female Self," Women's Studies 7 (1980): 55-66.
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have made a "World of my own.' (sig. A4'')
This announcement of unsatisfied ambition serves at least two
purposes. First, by claiming the Blazing World as an exclusive
product of her brain and fancy, Cavendish locates it within the
subjective realm of her imagination, thereby guarding herself
from making Hooke-like claims of objective certainty regarding
the material world. Second, and perhaps more important, by
calling attention to her own ambition, she calls into question
Hooke's portrayal of a series of interchangeable, passive, and
ambitionless empiricists. By parading her own allegedly
boundless will and ego. Cavendish questions the degree to
which the subjective interference of the self can be eliminated,
thus problematizing the premise on which Hooke's objective
certainty was based.
The narrative begins as a story of an unnamed young woman
from a third world distinct from either the earth or the Blazing
World. Improbable as it may sound, she accidently enters the
Blazing World, so overwhelming its emperor with her beauty
that he reveres her as a divinity, marries her, and gives her
absolute authority over the Blazing World, after which he
disappears from the narrative entirely. As the empress
' This passage is frequendy cited as being representative of Cavendish's eccentric,
because zealously overt, desire for fame. Critics have tended to read Cavendish's
expressions of desire for fame literally; as a consequence, they tend to explain her
interest in fame psychologically rather than as a philosophical positioning of her
"self that allows for an exploration of the problem of "subjectivity." As the
wildly fanciful narrative that follows suggests. Cavendish seems at least as
interested in speculative freedom and in the subjectivity in which our inquiry into
the world is inevitably trapped as she is in fame. Notable exceptions to the literal
school include James Fitzmaurice and Jean Gagen. Fitzmaurice points out that
Cavendish's outspoken desire for fame helped her characterize herself as a
"harmless eccentric," a characterization that protected her from criticism she might
otherwise receive. Gagen places Cavendish's desire for fame within the context of
the "Renaissance humanism out of which it arose." See James Fitzmaurice, "Fancy
and the Family: Self-Characterizations of Margaret Cavendish," Huntington Library
Quarterly 53 (1990): 199-209 and Jean Gagen, "Honor and Fame in the Works of
the Duchess of Newcastle," Studies in Philology 56 (1959): 519-38.
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familiarizes herself with her new world and experiments with
her absolute authority over it, she explores two competing
modes of inquiry. The first mode—empiricism—is presented by
a collective group of experimental philosophers, astronomers,
and various other natural philosophers, most of whom actively
practice a Hooke-like empiricism; the second mode—rational
ism—is presented by a second main character, the duchess of
Newcastle herself, who appears as a character within her own
narrative and whom I will distinguish from the author
Cavendish by referring to as "the duchess."
The empress is naturally curious about the world she
suddenly finds under her command and, observing that each
sort of creature follows a profession "most proper for the
nature of [its] species," she encourages the pursuit of the arts
and sciences by erecting schools and founding several societies
(15). In the subsequent satire of the Royal Society into which
Cavendish throws her empress—in which giants present
themselves as architects and parrot-men as orators—the
empress's empiricism is tested and falters. In particular, her
exchanges with her experimental philosophers, whose enthusi
asm for optical instruments appears boundless, problematize the
value of optical instruments and of the "eye" as the exclusive
bases for knowing the world. When, for instance, she asks the
experimental philosophers to observe thunder and lightning
through their telescopes in order to solve a dispute troubling
her astronomers regarding the true nature of thunder and
lightning, the "telescopes cause more differences and divisions
amongst them, then [sic] ever they had before," each observer
arguing for his own interpretation of what is seen through the
telescope (26). The empress eventually becomes impatient with
their quarrels and commands them to break their telescopes,
explaining that
if...Glasses were true Informers, they would rectifie...ir
regular Sense and Reason; But...Nature has made your
Sense and Reason more regular then [sic] Art has your
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Glasses; for they are meer deluders, and will never lead
you to the knowledge of Truth. (27-8)
The empress's argument here, like Cavendish's parallel
argument in Observations, that glasses distort images and that
sense and reason are sufficient for understanding the world,
directly contradicts Hooke's claim that eyepieces of microscopes
could function as correctives to otherwise deficient senses.*"
The Hooke-like experimental philosophers are so visibly
crushed by the empress's command to break all telescopes that
she eventually relents and allows them to keep the telescopes
"upon the condition, that their disputes and quarrels should
remain within their Schools, and cause no factions or distur
bances in State, or Government" (28). Their enthusiasm for
optical glasses remains undiminished, and, hoping to make
Gerald Dennis Meyer, who claims that "the rise of the scientific lady in England
begins with Margaret Cavendish," explains that the Newcastles purchased some of
the finest microscopes in the world during their exile in Holland:
Margaret contended that microscopes and telescopes were faulty and
imperfect inventions, as in her day they often were. Francis Bacon had
stressed the need for instruments to aid and correct sense impressions, but
instruments of magnification, as they had developed, often seemed rather
to increase distortion and error. Through lenses poorly fashioned, the
objects to be scrutinized frequently appeared distorted. She thought,
perhaps speciously, that telescopes were even more misleading than
microscopes because errors and imperfections were multiphed by distance.
Resultant discoveries were to be eyed with caution, if not with scepticism.
Margaret was not alone in her belief that "Concave and Convex glasses,
and the like...represent the figure of an Object...very deformed and
misshaped: also a Glass that is flaw'd, crack'd, or broke...will present
numerous pictures of one Object." Bad glass meant bad reflection and
refraaion as Robert Hooke, curator of the Royal Society, well knew.
(3-4)
While conceding that Cavendish would certainly have known about the
technological imperfections of optical glasses, I suggest that she opposed them on
philosophical rather than merely technological grotmds. See Gerald Dennis Meyer,
The Scientific Lady in England 16S0-1760 (Berkeley: University of California Press,
1955).
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amends for her displeasure with the telescope, they present her
their microscopes.
The empress observes through a microscope a fly, charcoal,
a Nettle, a flea, and a louse, each of which are illustrated and
discussed in Hooke's Micrographia. The flea and the louse
appear "so terrible to her sight, that they had almost put her in
a swoon," and when she recovers, she inquires, as her author
similarly inquires in Observations, into the practical value of
such observations.
The empress, after the view of those strangely-shaped
Creatures, pitied much those that are molested with them,
especially poor Beggars, which although they have
nothing to live on themselves, are yet necessitated to
maintain and feed of their own flesh and blood, a
company of such terrible Creatures called Lice...[A]fter
the Empress had seen the shapes of these monstrous
Creatures, she desir'd to know. Whether their Micro
scopes could hinder their biting, or at least shew some
means how to avoid them? (31-2)
The general fruitlessness of the experiments also disappoints the
author. Cavendish, whose intrusive narrative reveals her
impatience with optical instruments and includes a barb at
Hooke's lengthy and detailed observations in Micrographia:
To relate all their Optick observations through the
several sorts of their Glasses, would be a tedious work,
and tire even the most patient Reader, wherefore I'le pass
them by. (32-3)
But Cavendish's real criticism lies neither in the empiricists'
tediousness nor in their lack of utility; her concern is their
unwillingness to acknowledge the inevitable interference of their
own subjectivity.
Were Cavendish writing, as she seems to claim in the
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preface, simply to compensate for her frustrated ambition at
being a subject rather than a monarch, she might now conclude
her tale, deriving compensatory satisfaction from the empress's
absolute command over the Blazing World's considerable
imaginary wonders. As I have tried to suggest, however.
Cavendish's attention in the preface to her own political
disappointments and to her personal status as subject is a
rhetorical device meant to advance her deeper philosophical
interest in questions of epistemology and perception. Midway
through the narrative she calls further attention to herself and
to her philosophical entrapment by her own subjectivity by
entering the narrative directly as the ambitious subject, the
duchess of Newcastle. Having provided a satire of Robert
Hooke and his empiricist project in the first half of the
narrative, she reserves the second half for a direct exploration
of alternative modes of inquiry through which the world can be
known. Like Descartes, though more playfully, she traces the
steps that lead to her rationalism. She too must learn the
consolation of "masterfing] [herself] rather than fortune, and
changfing] [her] desires rather than the order of the world."*'
The duchess is invited into the Blazing World to serve as an
advisor for the empress, and she is understandably dazzled by
its wonders. Her initial enthusiasm dims, however, as she
begins to feel the effects of her own "extream ambition" and
falls into a melancholy out of envy for the empress's power.
When the empress asks the duchess for the cause of her
melancholy, the duchess confesses, "I would fain be as you are,
that is, an Empress of a World, and I shall never be at quiet
until I be one" (94). Like Robert Hooke, who hoped that by
discovering the secret workings of nature he might re-establish
his "command over things," the duchess also yearns, at least
initially, for command over a material world.
" Rene Descartes, Discourse on Method, in The Philosophical Writings of Descartes,
trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1985), 1:123.
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The empress promises to do everything in her power to help
the duchess, and she turns to her immaterial spirits for advice,
asking them whether other worlds exist and, if so, whether the
duchess might become empress of one of them. The spirits in
turn ask why the duchess wishes to command a material world,
which can only be known in parts, when she can create an
immaterial world, which she can know and govern absolutely.
As they explain,
You can enjoy no more of a material world then [sic] a
particular Creature is able to enjoy, which is but a small
part, considering the compass of such a world; and you
may plainly observe it by your friend the Empress here,
which although she possesses a whole World, yet enjoys
she but a part thereof; neither is she so much acquainted
with it, that she knows all the places. Countries, and
Dominions she Governs...Why should you desire to be
Empress of a Material World, and be troubled with the
cares that attend Government.^ When as by creating a
World within your self, you may enjoy all both in whole
and in parts, without controle or opposition. (97)
The duchess agrees with the immaterial spirits, and, after trying
to create first Cartesian and then Hobbesian immaterial worlds,
she happily and industriously applies herself to creating an
immaterial world entirely of her own invention. Made of "the
Rational parts of Matter, which are the parts of [her] Mind,"
the world she creates provides her with "more delight and
glory, than ever Alexander or Cesar did [have] in conquering
this terrestrial world" (159).
Significantly, the duchess is restored to herself because the
immaterial world she creates provides her not with truth, or
reality, but with "delight and glory." Unlike Hooke, who
would banish the products of "the Brain and Fancy," keeping
his eye servilely fixed on fragments of the external physical
world, the duchess turns inward to the speculative and
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subjective pleasures of the mind. Faced with the fact exem
plified by Hooke's empiricist compendium—that material
worlds are knowable, if they are knowable at all, only in
parts—Cavendish embraces an extreme rationalism.
The duchess's rejection of material for immaterial worlds
clearly re-enacts Cavendish s decision in the preface to create
the Blazing World because fortune provided her with no
material world over which to be mistress. The text thus begins
what Catherine Gallagher has called
a process of infinite regression...Presumably, the [newly
created world of the character, Maigaret Cavendish,] will,
like the Blazing World, also contain a Margaret Cavendish
who wishes to be empress of a world and decides instead
to create a microcosm, etc. ad infinitum
This projected infinite series of immaterial worlds would
undoubtedly have delighted Cavendish.
Remembering,
however, that Blazing World was written in response to
Micrographia and the empiricist frenzy out of which Micrographia emerged, we might place Gallagher's observation in
context and view the narrative not as a process of infinite
regression, but as a series of magnifications of the self.
Cavendish responds to Hooke, finally,
by providing a
micrographia of the mind. To his "small pictures" of magnified
bits and pieces of the external physical world. Cavendish
provides "small pictures" of the ongoing, unpredictable
discourse of the mind. Where Hooke uses his lens to observe
items from the external physical world. Cavendish uses her
narrative to preserve what she can of the subjective and often
erratic dialogues of the self. Both works are inevitably
fragmentary and incomplete, but they form an interesting and
important antinomy in the historical debate over empiricism
and rationalism.
Gallagher, "Embracing the Absolute," 31-2.
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Reading both Blazing World and Observations primarily as
philosophical texts and, in particular, as responses to Robert
Hooke's Micrographia helps to explain Cavendish's unsystematic
procedure and her attention to her own eccentricity in these
works. Her attention to her status as subject, for instance, can
be read as a philosophical positioning, which she saw as
inevitably complicating all knowledge of the world. Similarly,
her attention to her own will and ambition is an extravagant
but convincing example of the subjectivity in which our inquiry
into the world is inevitably trapped. Equipped with an extreme
scepticism positing, in Virginia Woolf's summation, that "we
are in utter darkness," Cavendish seems to have responded by
experiencing more intensely the "rapture of [her] thought.""
Taken aback by Hooke's dark confidence in the ease with
which man might be reduced to an automaton-scribe, she
focuses on the mediator between the empiricist's glass and his
hand: how faithful, how sincere, she asks, is the eye?
" Viiginia Woolf, "The Duchess of Newcastle," in MichMe Barrett, ed.. Women
and Writing (New York; Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979), 84.

